This kind of fear is rooted, I shall argue, in a fundamentally misconceived vision of our own humanity: a vision that depicts us as 'locked-in agents': as beings whose minds and physical abilities are fixed quantities, apt (at best) for mere support and scaffolding by their best technologies. In contrast to this view I have argued (Clark 1997 (Clark , 2003 that human minds and bodies are essentially open to episodes of deep and transformative re-structuring, in which new equipment (both physical and 'mental') can become quite literally incorporated into the thinking and acting systems that we identify as minds and persons. In what follows, I pursue this theme with special attention to the very notion of the human-machine interface itself.
It helps to start with the commonplace. Sensing and moving are the spots where the rubber of embodied agency meets the road of the wider world, the world outside the agent's physical boundaries. The typical human agent, circa 2004, feels herself to be a bounded physical entity in contact with the world via a variety of standard sensory channels, including touch, vision, smell and hearing. It is a commonplace observation, however, that the use of simple tools can lead to alterations in that local sense of embodiment. Picking up and using a stick, we feel as if we are touching the world at the end of the stick, not (usually) as if we are touching the stick with our hand. The stick, it has sometimes been suggested, is in some way incorporated and the overall effect seems more like bringing a temporary whole new agent-world circuit into being, rather than simply exploiting the stick as a helpful prop or tool.
In these cases there suddenly seem to be two interfaces at play: the place where the stick meets the hand, and the place where the extended system "biological-agent+stick" meets the rest of the world.
When we read about new forms of human-machine interface, we are again confronted by a similar duality, and an accompanying tension.
What makes such interfaces appropriate as mechanisms for human enhancement is, it seems, precisely their potential role in creating whole new agent-world circuits. But insofar as they succeed at this task, the new agent-tool interface itself fades from view, and the proper picture is one of an extended or enhanced agent confronting the (wider) world.
In sections 1 and 2 I shall lightly explore this notion of the interface, and then look at some examples in which new systemic wholes are created by various forms of technological intervention. Section 3 asks under what conditions it becomes proper to speak of enhanced agents rather than un-enhanced agents with new props and scaffoldings. Here, I try to show that there is more at issue than a way of speaking, and that there are scientifically and philosophically important differences between the two cases. Next (section 4) I extend the discussion from bodily augmentation to mental augmentation, indicating what would need to be done to make the vexed idea of enhanced human mentality concrete. The discussion continues (section 5) by developing a notion of the 'profoundly embodied agent' as a means of marking the philosophical and scientific importance of our potential for repeated and literal episodes of self re-configuration. The paper ends by relating this image of profound embodiment to some questions (and fears) concerning converging technologies for improving human performance.
1. What's in an Interface? Haugeland (1998) is, in part, an extended philosophical meditation on the very idea of an interface. The goal is to uncover the underlying principles "for dividing systems into distinct subsystems along nonarbitrary lines" (op cit, p.211). According to Haugeland, the notions of 'component' 'system' and 'interface' are all interdefined and interdefining. Components are those parts of a larger whole that interact through interfaces. Systems are "relatively independent and self-contained" composites of such interfaced components. And an interface itself is: " a point of interactive "contact" between components such that the relevant interactions are well-defined, reliable and relatively simple"
Haugeland 1998 p 213
Haugeland is right, I think, to point to the nature of interactions as the key to the location of an interface. We discern an interface where we discern a kind of regimented, often deliberately designed, point of contact between two or more independently tuneable or replaceable parts. It does not seem correct, however, to insist that flow across the interface be simple. The idea here seems to be that we find genuine interfaces only where we find energetic or informational bottlenecks, as if an interface must be a narrow channel yielding what Haugeland describes as 'low bandwidth' coupling. This is important for Haugeland's argumentative purpose, as he means to show (by appeal to broadly-speaking Gibsonian characterizations of sensing: see Gibson (1979) ) that human sensing typically yields very taskvariable, high-bandwidth forms of agent-environment coupling, and thus to argue that no genuine interface or interfaces separate agent and world. Instead, there is said to be "intimate intermingling of mind, body and world" (op cit 224).
The Gibsonian angle is useful, as it points to two distinct ways in which we might conceive of our own biological sensory systems.
According to the standard (non-Gibsonian) conception, a sensory interface is a point of information transduction. It is a point at which rich energetic input (eg visual input) must begin to be somehow transformed into discrete internal action-guiding representations. This is the notion of the sensory interface as a kind of fixed veil between an agent and a represented world. But there is another way to look at (at least some uses of) sensing, which can be introduced by a simple example. Consider running to catch a fly ball in baseball.
Giving perception it's standard role, we might assume that the job of the visual system is to transduce information about the current position of the ball so as to allow a reasoning system to project its future trajectory. It seems, however, that nature has a more elegant and efficient solution: you simply run so that the ball's trajectory looks straight against the visual background (McBeath et al (1995) .
This solution exploits a powerful invariant in the optic flow, discussed in Lee and Reddish (1981) . But most importantly for our purposes, it highlights (see Maturana (1980) ) a very different role for the perceptual coupling itself. Instead of using sensing to get enough information inside, past the visual bottleneck, so as to allow the reasoning system to 'throw away the world' and solve the problem wholly internally, it uses the sensor as an open conduit allowing environmental magnitudes to exert a constant influence on behavior.
Sensing is here depicted as the opening of a channel, with successful whole-system behavior emerging when activity in this channel is kept within a certain range. What is created is thus a kind of new, task-specific agent-world circuit. ii As Randall Beer recently puts it:
"the focus shifts from accurately representing an environment to continuously engaging that environment with a body so as to stabilize patterns of co-ordinated behavior that are adaptive for the agent" machines. Yet that web, in action, can sometimes function as a single unified resource. Nonetheless we still think of it as a web of distinctbut-interfaced devices. And we do so not because the point of each machines contact with the grid is narrow (it isn't) but because there exist, for each machine on the grid, very well-defined points of potential detachment and re-engagement. We discern interfaces at the points at which one machine can be easily disengaged and another engaged instead, allowing the first to join another grid, or to operate in a stand-alone fashion. An interface, I conclude, is indeed a point of contact between two items across which the types of performance-relevant interaction are reliable and well-defined. But there is no requirement that such interfaces be narrow-bandwidth bottlenecks. Recent experimental work reveals more about the kinds of mechanisms that may be at work in such cases. A much-publicized example is the work by Miguel Nicolelis and colleagues on a BMI (Brain-Machine Interface) that allows a macaque monkey to use thought control to move a robot arm. In the most recent version of this work, Carmena et al (2003) implanted 320 electrodes in the frontal and parietal lobes of a monkey. The electrodes allowed a monitoring computer to record neural activity across multiple cortical ensembles while the monkey learnt to use a joystick to move a cursor across a computer screen for rewards. As in previous work, the computer was able to extract the neural activity patterns corresponding to different movements (including direction and grip).
Next, the joystick is disconnected. But the monkey is still able to use its neural activity to directly control the cursor for rewards, and learns to do so. Finally (and this is the new element in the work) these commands are diverted to a robot arm whose actual motions are then translated into on screen cursor movements (including an on-screen equivalent of forceful gripping). This closes the loop.
Instead of the monkey merely moving an unseen robot arm by thought control alone, the movements now yield visual feedback in the form of on-screen cursor motion.
When the robot arm was inserted into the control loop, the monkey displayed a striking degradation of behavior. It took two full days of practice for fluent thought-control over the onscreen cursor to be reestablished. The reason was that the monkey's brain now had to learn to factor in the mechanical and temporal 'friction' created by the new physical equipment: it had to factor in the mechanical and dynamical properties of the robot arm and the time delays (which were substantial, in the 60-90 millisecond range) caused by interposing the motion of the arm between neural command and on-screen feedback.
By the time full fluency was achieved, it is reasonable to conjecture that these properties of the (still unseen) distant arm were incorporated into the monkey's own body-schema. In support of this, the experimenters were able to track real long-term physiological changes in the response profiles of fronto-parietal neurons following use of the BMI, leading them to comment that: Although our own capacity for such re-negotiation is (I believe) vastly under-appreciated, it really should come as no great surprise, given the facts of biological bodily growth and change. The human infant must learn by 'self-exploration' which neural commands bring about which bodily effects, and must then practice until skilled enough to issue those commands without conscious effort. This process has been dubbed (Meltzoff and Moore (1997) ) "body babbling" and continues until the infant body becomes "transparent equipment". Since bodily growth and change continues, it is simply good design not to permanently lock in knowledge of any particular configuration, but instead to deploy plastic neural resources and an ongoing regime of monitoring and re-calibration (for some excellent discussion, see Ramachandran and Blakeslee (200?)) As a second class of examples of re-calibration and re-negotiation, consider the plasticity revealed by work in Sensory Substitution.
Pioneered in the 60's and 70's by Paul Bach y Rita and colleagues, the earliest such systems were grids of blunt 'nails' fitted to the backs of blind subjects, and taking input from a head-mounted camera. In response to the camera input, specific regions of the grid became active, gently stimulating the skin under the grid.At first, subjects report only a vague tingling sensation. But after wearing the grid while engaged in various kinds of goal-driven activity (walking, eating, etc) the reports change dramatically. Subjects stop feeling the tickling on the back and start to report rough, quasi-visual experiences of looming objects etc. After a while, a ball thrown at the head causes instinctive and appropriate ducking. The causal chain is 'deviant': it runs via the systematic input to the back. But the nature of the information carried, and the way it supports the control of action, is suggestive of the visual modality. Performance using such devices can be quite impressive. In a recent review article, Bach y Rita and Kercel note that TVSS [Tactile Visual Substitution Systems] have:
" been sufficient to perform complex perception and 'eye'-hand co-ordination tasks. These have included face recognition, accurate judgment of speed and direction of a rolling ball with over 95% accuracy in batting the ball as it rolls over a table edge, and complex inspection-assembly tasks".
Bach y Rita and Kercel 2001
The key to effective sensory substitution is goal-driven motor engagement. It seems to be crucial that the head-mounted camera be under the subject's motor control. This meant that the brain could, in effect experiment via the motor system, giving commands that systematically varied the input, so as to begin to form hypotheses about what information the tactile signals might be carrying. Such training yields quite a flexible new agent-world circuit. Once trained in the use of the head-mounted camera the motor system operating the camera could be changed, eg to a hand-held camera, with no loss of acuity. The touch pad, too, could be moved to new bodily sites, and there was no tactile/visual confusion: an itch scratched under the grid caused no 'visual' effects (for these results, again see Bach y Rita and Kercel (2003)).
Such technologies, though still experimental, are now increasingly advanced. The back-mounted grid is often replaced by a tonguemounted coin sized array, and extensions in other sensory modalities. Bach y Rita and Kercel (op cit) give the nice example of a touch-sensor-rich glove that allows leprosy patients to begin to feel again using their hands. The patient is fitted with the glove that transmits signals to a forehead mounted tactile disc-array, and rapidly reports feeling sensations of touch at the fingertips . This is presumably because the motor-control over the sensors runs via commands to the hand, so the sensation is subsequently projected to that site.
The line between these kinds of rehabilitative strategy and wholly new forms of bodily and sensory enhancement is already thin to the point of non-existence. There is advanced work on night-vision versions of sensory substitution, and (at the more dramatic end of this spectrum) it is possible bypass the existing sensory peripheries, feeding signals direct to cortex (see Bach y Rita and Kercel (2001) and discussion in Clark (2003) ). Even without penetrating the existing surface of skin and skull, sensory enhancement and bodily extension is a pervasive possibility. One rather unusual example ,reported in Schrope (2001) , is a US Navy innovation known as a tactile flight suit. It is important, in all these cases, that the new agent-world circuits be trained and calibrated in the context of a whole agent engaged in world-directed (goal-driven) activity. Here too, we encounter a Gibsonian theme, in the form of:
"a conception of the senses in terms of Gibson's (1966) perceptual systems (i.e. as a whole and complex system that is functionally constituted as one piece from beginning to end…) but [going] In human subjects suffering from unilateral neglect (in which stimuli from within a certain region of egocentrically coded space are selectively ignored) it has been shown that the use of a stick as a tool for reaching actually extends the area of visual neglect to encompass the space now reachable using the tool (see Berti and Frassinetti (2000) ). Berti and Frassinetti conclude that: "The brain makes a distinction between 'far space' (the space beyond reaching distance) and 'near space' (the space within reaching distance)" and that "…simply holding a stick causes a remapping of far space to near space. In effect the brain, at least for some purposes, treats the stick as though it were a part of the body" Berti and Frassinetti (2000) p. 415
The plastic neural changes reported by Carmena et al (section2 above), and now further underlined by Maravita and Iriki, and by Berti and Frassinetti are, I want to suggest, the key to a real (philosophically important and scientifically solid) distinction between true incorporation into the body-schema and mere use. The body-schema, in this sense, is not the same thing as the body-image, though the two can sometimes be related. As I shall use the terms ,the body image is a conscious construct, able to inform thought and reasoning about the body. The body schema is a suite of neural settings that implicitly (and non-consciously) define a body in terms of its capabilities for action, for example, by defining the extent of 'near space' for action programs vii . I would speculate, however, that the striking conscious experiential datum of equipment (not just rakes but even cars and violins) falling transparent in use is plausibly one result, in conscious agents, of just these kinds of deeper changes: changes (that may be temporary, context-dependent, or longterm) in the body-schema itself.
It is important to notice that we can certainly imagine tool-users (perhaps even fluent tool-users?) whose brains were not engineered so as to adapt the body-schema in these ways. Such beings would always use tools the way we typically begin: by representing the tool and its features and powers (its length, for example) and calculating effective uses accordingly. We can even imagine (I think) beings who were so fast and good at these calculations as to deploy the tools with the same skill and efficacy as an expert human agent. The contrast that would remain, even in the latter kind of case, would be between the skilled agent's first representing the shape, dimensions and powers of the tool and then inferring (consciously or otherwise) that you can now reach such and such, and do such and such, and agents whose brains were so constituted that experience with the tool results in (for example) a suite of altered vRFs such that objects within toolaugmented reaching range are now automatically treated as falling within 'near space'.
These are surely distinct strategies. The latter strategy might be especially recommended for beings whose bodies (like our own) are naturally subject to growth and change. Beings deploying this strategy do not relate to their own bodies the way classical cognitive science depicts the intelligent agent as relating to its world, namely, via a process of objectivist representation and inference. The deep distinction is thus between various forms of knowledge-based use (which involves a lot of explicit representation of features, properties, and inferences based on those features), and genuine episodes of assimilation and integration, which can now be defined as cases in which plastic neural resources are re-calibrated (in the context of goal-directed whole agent activity) to reflect new bodily and sensory opportunities. In this way, our own embodied activity brings forth new systemic wholes.
Extended Cognition
Could anything like this notion of 'incorporation' (rather than mere use) and new systemic wholes get a grip in the more ethereal domain of mind and cognition? Could human minds be genuinely extended and augmented by cultural and technological tweaks, or is it always (as many evolutionary psychologists, such as Pinker (200?) would have us believe) just the same old mind with a shiny new tool?
Here, the story is murkier by far. My own view, defended at much greater length elsewhere (see Chalmers (1998), Clark (2003) (In Press)) is that external and non-biological information-processing resources are also apt for temporary or long-term recruitment and incorporation rather than simply knowledge-based use, and that to whatever extent that this holds, we are not just bodily and sensorily but also cognitively permeable agents. But whereas we can point, in the case of basic tool use, to visible neural changes that accompany the genuine assimilation of new bodily structure, it is harder to know what to look for in the case of mental and cognitive routines.
One suggestion (Clark and Chalmers (1998) ) is that cognitive incorporation occurs when the existing system learns a complex problem-solving routine that makes deep implicit commitments to the robust availability of certain operations and/or bodies of information while carrying out some species of on-line problem solving. This is the cognitive equivalent, I would now suggest, of the implicit commitments to bodily shape and potentials for action made by tuning the receptive fields of bi-modal neurons. In the cognitive case, what matters is the delicate temporal tuning of multiple participating elements (including, for example, calls to internal or external information stores) that simply factor in the availability of those operations or bodies of information.
The field of 'active vision' provides a nice example. Ballard et al (1997) studied a task in which subjects copied a pattern of colored blocks by moving them from one on-screen area (the model) to another (the target). Using eye-tracking techniques, the experimenters found that subjects looked to the model both before and after picking up a block. The explanation for the apparently unnecessary repetitions of gaze seems to be that when glancing at the model, the subject stores only one piece of information: either the color or the position of the next block to be copied (not both).The conclusion was that the brain uses repeated visual fixation to link a target location to a type of information (color or position) retrieving that information 'just-in-time' for use. In this way, according to the authors:
"…fixation can be seen as binding the value of the variable currently relevant for the task [and] changing gaze is analogous to changing the memory reference in a silicon computer". Ballard et al (1997) p. 723 In this respect, for this task, the brain simply uses the external scene as its memory store.
This subtle reliance on the external scene is dramatically illustrated by recent work on so-called 'change blindness' (see eg Simons (2000) in which simple experimental manipulations (the masking of motion transients while large changes are made to a visually presented scene) suggest viii the surprising sparseness of our on-the-spot (all in one instant, or 'snapshot' -see Noe (2004)) conscious awareness.
Subjects seldom these changes, and are often amazed when they realize what has happened without their noticing it. One diagnosis of why we are not normally aware of any such sparseness is that our feeling of "seeing all the detail" in the scenes (and hence the surprisingness of the demonstrations of unseen changes) is really a reflection of something implicit in the overall problem-solving organization in which vision participates. That organization 'assumes' the (ecologically normal) ability to retrieve more detailed info when needed, so we feel (correctly, in an important sense) that we are already in command of the detail ix .
The point, for present purposes, is that the brain need not actively represent the availability of such and such information from any given internal or external location. Instead, it simply deploys a problem-solving routine (that may involve programmed saccades to a visual location, or calls to biological memory) whose fine temporal structure assumes the easy availability of such and such information from such and such a location. It is in this way (I am suggesting) that non-biological informational resources can become -either temporarily or longterm -genuinely incorporated into the problemsolving whole. Just as the experienced brain need not (though it sometimes can) explicitly represent the shape of a tool and then infer the available reach, so too it need not (though it sometimes can) first represent the availability of specific information at some location, and then infer that it can find what it needs by accessing a given resource.
Instead, a problem-solving routine is delicately 'grown' so as to maximally exploit the local informational field x . Such a field can include biological resources, environmental structure, and cognitive artifacts such as notebooks and laptops. As we move towards an era of wearable computing and ubiquitous information access, the robust, reliable information fields to which our brains delicately adapt their routines will become increasingly dense and powerful, further blurring the distinction between the cognitive agent and her best tools, props and artifacts. We can distinguish three 'grades' of embodiment. I shall call these (rather unimaginatively) 'mere embodiment', 'modest embodiment' and 'profound embodiment'. A 'merely embodied' creature or robot would be one equipped with a body and sensors, able to engage in closed-loop interactions with its world, but for whom the body was nothing but a means to implement solutions arrived at by pure reason. Imagine also that this being can control the body only by issuing a complex series of micro-managing commands to every tiny muscle, tendon, spring and actuator. A close real-world approximation to such a being is the early mobile robot, such as Shakey, built over three decades ago at the Stanford Research Institute. A 'modestly embodied' creature or robot would then be one for whom the body was not just another problem-space, requiring constant micro-managed control, but was rather a resource whose own features and dynamics (of sensor placement, of linked tendons and muscle groups etc) could be actively exploited allowing for increasingly fluent forms of action selection and control. Much work in contemporary robotics explores this middle ground of modest embodiment, for example, Barbara Webb's (1996) lovely work on the robot cricket in which sensor placement and time delays caused by signal transmission along internal pathways prove integral to its capacity to identify the song of a mate and locomote in that direction.
What makes this an example of only modest embodiment is that the specific solution is 'locked in' by the details of the hard-wired architecture itself. Such systems are congenitally unable to learn new kinds of body-exploiting solution 'on the fly', in response to damage, growth, or change.
It is perhaps hardly surprising that much (though not all-see Lungarella et al (2003) ) work in real-world robotics explores this space of 'modest embodiment': after all, robots (so far) don't grow, or use tools, or self-repair. By contrast, as we have seen, biological systems (and especially us primates) seem to be specifically designed so as to constantly search for opportunities to make the most of body and world, checking for what is available, and then (at various timescales and with varying degrees of difficulty) integrating new resources very deeply, creating whole new agent-world circuits in the process. A 'profoundly embodied' creature or robot is thus (according to this definition) one that is highly engineered so as to be able to learn to make maximal problem-simplifying use of an openended variety of internal, bodily, or external sources of order. We saw, in previous sections, some hints of the kinds of engineering involved. It includes the use of plastic neural resources to create and update a body-schema, the capacity to factor the availability of information (wherever and however stored) into the heart of temporally fine-tuned problem-solving routines, and the capacity (in conscious beings like ourselves) for equipment to become transparent in use. This is not, of course, an all-or-nothing divide. Profound embodiment comes in many degrees and flavors, all the way from almost (but not quite) fully hard-wired solutions to amazingly plastic and re-configurable ones. But primates, as we have seen, seem to fall quite close to the more radically re-configurable end of this spectrum.
But why describe this as 'profound embodiment' rather than as a return to the outdated (or so many of us believe-see Clark (1997) for review) image of mind as a disembodied organ of control? The answer is that these kinds of minds are not in the least disembodied.
Rather, they are promiscuously body-and-world exploiting. They are forever testing and exploring the possibilities for incorporating new resources and structures deep into their problem-solving regimes.
They are, to use the jargon of Clark (2003) , the minds of Natural-Born Cyborgs: of systems continuously re-negotiating their own limits, components, data-stores and interfaces. On this account, the body (any given biological or bio-technological body) is both critically important and constantly negotiable. It is critically important as it is a key player on the problem-solving stage. It is not simply the point at which processes of transduction pass the real problems (now rendered in rich internal representational formats) to an inner engine of disembodied reason. Instead, much of our skilled engagement with the world flows, we saw, from the way subtle neural changes enable the embodied agent to rather directly engage the world, without representing every detail of bodily form and action-taking capacity (a neat example was the way tool-use affects receptive field properties that then implicitly distinguish 'near' space and 'far' space). But by the same token, all this is now highly negotiable, with the body-schema and other supporting resources apparently able to re-form and re-configure as components, interfaces and resources change and shift.
All this matters, both scientifically and philosophically. It matters scientifically since it puts plasticity and adaptability where they belong, at center stage of our best models of minds, agents and persons. And it matters philosophically since it invites us to take our ii This is by no means an isolated case. Susan Hurley (1998) argues convincingly that perception typically involves whole cycles of input-output behavior in which sensing and acting dynamically combine to yield ongoing adaptive fit between whole organisms and the world. This perspective also fits well with recent work in so-called interactive vision (see (Ballard 1991 (Ballard ) (1991 , Ballard et al (1997) ). The theme of active engagement is similarly visible in a variety of recent treatments that stress the importance of motor activity to perception (see eg O'Regan and Noe (2001) , Churchland et al (1994) , Clark (1999 ), Noe (2004 .
iii In fact, it is rather doubtful that these kinds of Gibsonian invariant detection involve truly high-bandwith coupling at all. But (given the extreme difficulty of finding a non-controversial measure of objective bandwidth) I am willing to grant this for the sake of argument. My point will be that such high-bandwidth coupling, even if present, does not undermine the idea of interfaces located at just those points.
iv A typical description reads: "Computational Grids enable the sharing, selection, and aggregation of a wide variety of geographically distributed computational resources (such as supercomputers, compute clusters, storage systems, data sources, instruments, people) and presents them as a single, unified resource for solving large-scale compute and data intensive computing applications" (Quote taken from the GRID computing information center at: http://www.gridcomputing.com/). v See Mussa-Ivaldi and Miller (2003) , Bach y Rita and Kercel (2003), Clark (2003) vi See http://www.stelarc.va.com.au, and full discussion in Clark (2003) chapter 5 vii Gallagher (1998) expresses the difference like this: "Body schema can be defined as a system of preconscious, subpersonal processes that play a dynamic role in governing posture and movement… There is an important and often overlooked conceptual difference between the subpersonal body schema and what is usually called body image. The latter is most often defined as a conscious idea or mental representation that one has of one's own body" viii But see Simons et al (2002) for some important provisos. ix For some more detailed explorations of this idea, see O'Regan and Noe (2001) and Clark (2002) x For a lovely example of this, see Gray and Fu (In Press) . xi See, among many others, Varela et al (1991) , Clark (1997) , O'Regan and Noe (2001) xii For some important explorations of these themes, see Heidegger (1927) , Merleau-Ponty (1945 /1962 , Thompson, Varela and Rosch (1991) , O'Regan and Noe (2001) .
